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Abstract: Carbon budgets are a useful way to frame the climate mitigation challenge and much 
easier to agree upon than the allocation of emissions. We propose a mechanism with countries 
agreeing on the global carbon budget, while the decision to emit is decentralized at the country 
level. The revenue is collected in a global fund and allocated according to endogenously defined 
weights proportional to the marginal cost of climate change. The proposal features a unanimous 10 
agreement of the national citizenries of the world and global Pareto efficiency. We run a 
simulation in the spirit of the Paris Agreement, with zero emissions after 2055. At the Global 
Unanimity Equilibrium, permits are priced at 90$/tC, yielding 1.3 trillion dollars annually. 
Africa, India and the less developed countries in Asia are the only net recipients, while the US 
and China are the largest net contributors. 15 
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The global emissions problem is one where non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium among countries 
in the choice of their national emissions will suffer from the tragedy of the commons.1 That 
name is simply a dramatic way of saying that in the emissions ‘game,’ the Nash equilibrium is 
(massively) Pareto inefficient. Countries must cooperate to avoid this bad equilibrium. The COP 5 
meetings are venues that should be understood as attempts to build trust and solidarity among 
nations, so a cooperative solution that is Pareto efficient can be achieved.2 
However, a climate agreement to reduce emissions has been proved difficult to achieve. 
The global carbon budget, we argue, is a useful way of framing the climate mitigation challenge 
and perhaps a much easier issue to agree upon than the allocation of emission permits. We 10 
propose a method by which the decision on the level of carbon emissions can be decentralized to 
the regional or country level, where firms treat their emissions as a production input for which a 
price is charged. The revenues from these charges accumulate in a global fund, and are returned 
to global citizens according to national shares that are announced ex ante. We model the global 
economy as one with a single good, produced in all countries according to nationally specific 15 
production functions, which use labor and capital as inputs, and emit carbon according to 
nationally specific intensities with respect to output. We propose a global equilibrium in capital, 
output, and emissions. The markets for capital and output are standard. The market for carbon 
emissions is not. As mentioned, the demands for carbon emissions of countries are set by the 
profit-maximizing firms in each country, which must pay for standard inputs and proposed 20 
emissions. The supply of global emissions is unanimously agreed upon by country/regional 
citizenries. In choosing its desired global level of carbon emissions, each country maximizes the 
utility of its representative citizen, who benefits from consumption of the (unique consumption) 
good, and suffers damages from the global emissions level. In equilibrium, all markets clear: in 
particular, all countries agree upon the desired global carbon budget, which equals (in 25 
equilibrium) the sum total of the demands for carbon emissions of the world’s firms.  
 The virtues of the proposal are the following: (1) the global emissions level is not 
set by negotiations but by unanimous agreement of the national citizenries of the world; (2) the 
demand to emit carbon is decentralized to the firm level; (3) the equilibrium is globally Pareto 
efficient – there is no feasible allocation of capital, the good, and emissions that could make all 30 
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countries better off. The system can be viewed as one in which each country’s firms demand 
permits to emit carbon, for which they pay a common price, and the vector of country shares for 
the distribution of the carbon fund assures country unanimity of agreement on what the number 
of carbon permits globally should be.  
In our approach, decisions to emit are made at the firm level. Because firms decide upon 5 
their emissions as part of a profit-maximizing plan, no firm has an incentive to emit more than it 
demands. Substantial negotiations would be required to achieve agreement on the production and 
damage functions that characterize nations/regions. And the shares according to which the global 
carbon revenues are returned to nations must appear to be fair, for if they are not accepted, then 
unanimity on the global emissions level will dissolve. But once the mechanism is implemented, 10 
it will only be necessary to monitor that firms do pay for their profit-maximizing emissions to the 
global fund. 
 
A global unanimity equilibrium 
In this section, we model the above proposal and study its properties. There are n countries, each 15 
endowed with labor, capital, and a technology for producing a single good. Country  j  is 





(x,E) = x − h
j
(E) , (1) 
where  x  represents the GDP per capita of the country, 	
hj  is a convex damage function, and 	E  is 
the global level of carbon emissions. Each country has a concave aggregate production function 20 
 	y =Gj(K ) ,  (2) 
where 	y  is output of the single good and  K  is capital. It is assumed that labor is immobile 
across countries, but capital is mobile. Therefore, the production function 	
G j  assumes full 
employment of the country’s labor supply, which is implicit in equation (2). Besides its labor 
supply, country  j  is endowed with capital in the amount 	
K j .   25 
 Emissions are assumed to be proportional to production3,4 
 	
E j =η j y j  . (3) 
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Definition 1. An allocation of output and emissions 	((x1 ,E1),...,(xn ,En))  is globally feasible if 
there is an allocation of capital 	(K1 ,....,Kn)  and output 	( y1 ,..., yn)  such that: 
   	y j =Gj(K j ), E j =η j y j , x j = y j K j = K j∑∑∑∑  .  (4) 
Definition 2. A feasible allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible allocation that 
gives at least one country higher utility and no country lower utility. 5 
 We now describe how the economy works. There are three markets: for the produced 
good, whose price will be denoted  p ; for capital, whose interest rate is  r ; and for carbon 
emissions, whose price is  c . The firm in each country will demand capital to maximize profits: 
 	Π j = pGj(K j )− cη jG j(K j )− rK j , (5) 
where it must pay the carbon cost of the emissions it creates. All profits, which here include 10 
wages because labor is implicit in the production function, are returned to the population of the 
country. The carbon payments are deposited in an international fund, and will be distributed to 
countries as demogrants, where country 	j  will receive back a fraction 	aj  of total revenues. 
Thus, along with the price vector 	(p,c ,r) , global citizens observe a vector of shares 
	(a1 ,...,an)∈Δ
n−1 , where 	Δn−1  is the unit simplex in 	ℜn−1 . 15 
 The income of country  j  will be: 
 	
I j =Π j + rK j +aj cE , (6) 
where 	E  is global emissions, and so 	cE  is the value of the carbon fund. Each country supplies 
its entire capital endowment to the market.  
 It is clear there is a supply and demand for capital, and there is also a supply and demand 20 
for the good, because each country will demand the good in amount 	
I j p . 
  The demand for emissions is determined by the firms’ profit-maximizing choices, but we 
have yet to determine the supply of emissions, which we do as follows. Note that the utility of 




Π j + rK j +ajcE
p
−hj(E) . (7) 25 
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(Vj )'(E)=0 or aj
c
p
= (hj )'(E) . (8) 
We close the model by requiring that the citizenries of the  n  countries unanimously agree on the 
value of 	E . Thus, the global citizenry ‘supplies’ the emission permits in toto to firms. 5 
 We summarize the equilibrium of the economy as follows. 
Definition 3 A global unanimity equilibrium is a price vector 	(p,c ,r) , a share vector 
	(a1 ,...,an)∈Δ
n−1 , an allocation 	(x1 ,...,xn ,K1 ,...,Kn ,E1 ,...,En) , and a global supply of emission 
permits 	E  such that: 
(a) for each country  j ,  	(K j ,E j )  maximizes firm profits 	Π j = pGj(K j )− cE j − rK j , subject to the 10 
constraint 	E j =η jG j(K j ) , 
(b) for each country  j , 	E  maximizes its utility 	
Vj(E)=
Π j + rK j +ajcE
p
−hj(E) , 
(c) country  j ’s demand for the good is 
	
x j =
Π j + rK j +ajcE
p
, and 
(d) all markets clear:  	 K j = K j , E j = E , x j = Gj(K j )∑∑∑∑∑ .  
 We have: 15 
Proposition 2.  
A. Any global unanimity equilibrium satisfies the first-order conditions for Pareto efficiency. 
B. In equilibrium, the share of the global carbon fund that country i receives is proportional to 
its marginal damages 	(hj )'(E) . 
(Proved in Supplementary Note 1) 20 
 
 Economists will recognize that a global unanimity equilibrium is a species of Lindahl 
equilibrium. How would the equilibrium be achieved? An international team would collect the 
data (damage functions, production functions, capital endowments, carbon intensities of 
production) and compute the equilibrium, as we do in the next section. In particular, the share 25 
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vector 	a= (a1 ,...,an)  would be computed, and as we see from equation (9), the country shares of 
the emissions fund are proportional to marginal damages at the solution. As we wrote, the virtues 
of the solution are global Pareto efficiency, unanimity of agreement on the global carbon budget, 
and decentralization of the demands for carbon permits.  
 5 
Results 
To illustrate the implications of a global unanimity equilibrium, we simulate a 12-region world 
that negotiate, in the spirit of the Paris Agreement, a climate agreement for 40 years (2016-
2055), with the assumption of zero emissions afterwards. To approximate the dynamic situation, 
we endow each region with an annual stock of capital, an annual population, and a carbon 10 
intensity parameter that represent annual average values for the period in consideration. We also 
identify utility with the present value (in international $) of the average annual consumption, net 
of climate change damages. Climate change damages are computed as the monetized present 
value (also in international $) of warming costs to the end of the century associated to cumulative 
emissions. Details are provided in the Methods section. 15 
Data come from the baseline run in the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the 
Economy (RICE), representing a business-as-usual scenario.3,5 RICE is described in Nordhaus 
and Boyer3 and is one of the leading climate-economic models.6 The twelve regions correspond 
to United States (US), the European Union (EU), Japan, Russia, Eurasia, China, India, Middle 
East, Africa, Latin America, Other High Income countries (OHI), and Other Asian countries.  20 
We solve for the Global Unanimity Equilibrium using Mathematica 11 (details in the 
supplementary notes). At equilibrium, emission permits are priced at 90$/tC, yielding an average 
total revenue of 1.3 trillion dollars per annum. Global average emissions are 14.4 GtC for the 
period 2016-2055, and zero afterwards. Therefore, total cumulative emissions amount to 575 
GtC (approximately 2,100 GtCO2), which, according to (12), would result in a temperature 25 
increase around 1.3ºC above pre-industrial levels. These values are fairly consistent with the 
latest Global Warming of 1.5ºC IPCC report (Figure SPM1 (a) and (c)).12 
 
Results are summarized in Table 1 and Fig. 1. The following points are worth emphasizing: 
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1. Africa, China and India receive the largest shares of total revenue, being the regions with 
the highest marginal costs of increases in temperature according to RICE-2010. These 
three regions together receive over half of total revenue. 
2. However, when we account for the contribution to the global fund, China becomes the 
second largest net contributor, with a net payment of 78 billion dollars, only after the 99 5 
billion dollars of net contribution by the USA (Fig. 1 and last column in Table 1). The net 
contributions of these two regions alone amount for almost 60% of the total amount by 
net contributors. 
3. Africa, India and the small less developed countries in Asia are the only net recipients 
from the global fund. Africa, with 193 billion dollars, is by far the largest net recipient, 10 
obtaining 2.75 times the amount received by India (70 billion $). The net annual payment 
to India, Africa and Other Asia is $371 billion per annum, virtually quadruple the $100 
billion commitment to the developing world agreed upon in Paris (COP-21).  
4. Although the mechanism does not have any explicit built-in redistributive objective, 
inequality is reduced compared to 2015 values. For instance, while the US per capita 15 
income is 14 times that of Africa in 2015, it reduces to only 8.5 times on average for the 
period 2016-2055. This equalizing effect may originate in the negative relationship 
between income and climate change costs. Poorer regions are more intensively affected 
by climate change than richer regions, receiving a larger share of total revenue, hence 
reducing income differences. 20 
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Region 


















billion $ $ per capita as %GDP 
US 0.077 1.72 0.20 121.70 322.04 0.55 
EU 0.112 1.65 0.19 177.61 309.20 0.77 
Japan 0.015 1.14 0.13 23.62 214.23 0.50 
Russia 0.007 0.45 0.05 10.38 84.75 0.39 
Eurasia 0.010 0.44 0.05 16.05 82.75 0.61 
China 0.181 1.07 0.13 287.53 201.23 1.47 
India 0.131 0.74 0.09 207.27 139.04 1.94 
Midd.East 0.057 1.57 0.18 89.85 293.75 1.48 
Africa 0.220 1.11 0.13 348.59 208.52 3.06 
LatAme 0.063 0.75 0.09 99.80 141.43 0.78 
OHI 0.030 1.89 0.22 48.19 355.02 0.81 
Oth.Asia 0.099 0.62 0.07 157.30 116.20 1.49 
Table 1 Allocation of permits' claims and revenues. The shares of total revenue are 







(hj )'(E) . Each country 




c × E( ) , where  c × E( )  is total revenue from emission permits. 
GDP is the average value for the region in 2016-2055, the period under consideration. 
 5 
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Fig.1 Net contributions to the global fund. Bars represent the difference between the amount 
contributed and the amount received by each region from the global fund. Only India, Africa and 
Other Asian (representing Asian small developing countries) are net recipients, they receive from 
the global fund more than what they contribute from buying pollution permits. USA, China and 5 
Russia are the main net contributors. Quantities are in billion (109) of international dollars. 
 
 
Climate damages in RICE model are almost surely underestimated.13,14 For a robustness 
check, we repeat the analysis for a range of much larger damages, finding a similar pattern in the 10 
allocation of net recipients, with magnitudes increasing with the cost of climate change 
(Supplementary Note 5).  
The climate response of zero emissions is an important source of uncertainty in 
understanding the long-term climate response to a given quantity of cumulative emissions. We 
have followed the view that temperature tends to remain stable after zero emissions.15-17 15 
However, other models simulate temperature increases for a few decades after stabilizing,18,19 or 
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decreasing or slightly declining temperatures following zero emissions.20-23 We deal with this 
uncertainty showing that results are robust to the current range of Transient Climate Response to 
Emissions (TCRE). The current range of TCRE is “larger than the uncertainty range derived 
from the observational record,” suggesting that “there is little evidence of missing major positive 
carbon cycle feedbacks that would significantly decrease the estimate of carbon budgets derived 5 
from model TCRE values”.9 The robustness analysis finds that the effects of different values for 
the TCRE are equivalent to changing damages, scaling up or down magnitudes but keeping the 
same patterns (Fig. 2). 
 
 10 
Fig. 2 Net contributions and recipients for different values of the TCRE. The blue rectangle 
represents the net contributions for  ϕ = 1.35 , the best estimate used in our analysis. The values 
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Is the global unanimity equilibrium fair or just? 
There is a literature, mainly authored by philosophers and political theorists, concerning the 
justice or fairness of proposals for addressing the climate-change challenge. Potier et al. provide 
a recent comprehensive survey.24 It is not our task to review this literature here. We do, however, 
wish to comment somewhat further on the proposal’s virtues. 5 
 We believe it is difficult if not impossible to define what a just solution to the climate-
change challenge is, apart from providing a solution to the problem of the just global allocation 
of resources tout court. This point is forcefully made, in another area of discourse, by Murphy 
and Nagel.25 Their project is to define ‘just taxation,’ and their salient point is that it’s impossible 
to define just taxation apart from defining a just allocation of resources overall. If one had the 10 
solution to the larger problem, just taxation would be that taxation that would render after-tax 
incomes equal to the just distribution of income. Short of that, one could define second-best just 
taxation as taxation that would move a society in the direction of the just distribution of income. 
Surely any taxation that would not move a society towards its just distribution should not be 
considered just: and how would one be able to evaluate that movement without knowing what 15 
the just distribution is? 
 Similarly, one can argue that to be just, an allocation of permits to emit carbon among 
nations must necessarily produce a global distribution of income that moves in the direction of 
the globally just distribution of income. However, if we insisted on this criterion for evaluating 
proposals to address climate change, it is unlikely we would ever be able to design a politically 20 
acceptable agreement. We cannot make the solution of the climate-change challenge hostage to 
an agreement upon the rectification of the injustices committed by slavery, colonialism and 
imperialism, inter alia, but global justice surely requires the rectification of those historical 
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harms. Both the libertarian Robert Nozick26 and the egalitarian John Rawls27 would agree on that 
point. 
 We base our advocacy of the proposal offered on its following attractive features: 
• It decentralizes the achievement of a globally Pareto efficient allocation of capital, the 
good, and emissions; in particular, firms propose profit-maximizing levels of emissions, 5 
where the cost of emissions to them is determined by an equilibrium price that equates 
‘supply’ and ‘demand’ for emissions. 
• While the demand for emission (permits) is left to firms, the global supply of permits is 
determined by unanimous agreement among nations, concerning what global emissions 
level maximizes the country’s utility, given the prices of the good, capital and emissions, 10 
and the vector of shares  (a1,...,an ) . 
• No central authority sets the global supply of permits, nor is there any ex ante allocation 
of permits to individual firms or nations. 
• In equilibrium, the share of the global revenues from emissions fees that a country/region 
receives is proportional to the marginal damages from global emissions that it sustains.  15 
Thus, countries with more severe marginal damages are compensated more. 
• Our simulations indicate that, over a 40 year period, about $370 billion per annum would 
be transferred from the global North to the global South.   The three regions that are net 
recipients of these transfers are Africa, India and Other Asian. This is almost four times 
to annual transfers agreed upon in Paris. Global income distribution would as well 20 
improve, in the sense of lowering inter-regional inequality, although that was not an 
explicit goal of the proposal.  
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We do not wish to attempt a stronger ethical defense of the shares  (a1,...,an )  according to 
which the emissions fund will be distributed. The main justification of the specific share vector is 
that it engenders Pareto efficiency and global unanimity of national/regional citizenries with 
regard to the global emissions budget. Because arriving at a cooperative solution to this massive 
challenge to our species at this time is so important, the achievement of those objectives, we 5 
propose, is sufficient justification. 
 
Methods 
Here we explain in detail the components of the model for our application and their calibration 
based on RICE-2010: utility function, production function, carbon intensity and endowments 10 
(stock of capital and population). 




















(E) . (9) 
Both consumption and damages are measured in trillions of international US dollars. For a 15 















Climate change damages are generated by the increase in temperature, which, 
ultimately, depends on cumulative emissions. We proceed in three steps: First, we calibrate 
annual climate change damages for region  j  as a function of the increase in temperature  ΔT . 20 
Second, using TCRE, which relates global cumulative emissions until period 	t  to temperature 
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increases, we obtain annual damages as a function of cumulative emissions. Finally, we compute 
the present value of climate change damages. 
Annual climate damages for region  j  as a function of temperature increase  d j (ΔT )
 can 
be nicely fit to the baseline run data of RICE-2010 for the period 2005-2215 using an 
exponential function7: 5 
  
d j (ΔT ) = α1 j e
α2 j ΔT  (11) 
Damages are measured in annual trillions of international dollars, and temperature change in 
degree Celsius from pre-industrial levels. The parameters 	α1 j  and 	α2 j  are estimated to best fit 
each region’s damages to the data (Table S4; Supplementary Note 2 shows the goodness of the 
fit).  10 
Using the finding that temperature change is approximately linearly proportional to 
cumulative carbon emissions  Et
cum  in GtC,8,9 we write 
  ΔTt = ϕ 10
−3Et
cum  (12) 
where ϕ  is the ratio of warming to cumulative 	CO2  in ºC/TtC,  known as the Transient Climate 
Response to Emissions (TCRE). We take  ϕ = 1.35ºC  per TtC as the best estimate of an 15 
observationally constrained estimation.9,10 Combining (11) and (12), region  j  climate damages 
in year  t  from global cumulative emissions  Et









 Let  E0
c  represent historical cumulative CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2015, amounting to 
309GtC.11 Considering a stream of average annual emissions  E  during  N  years with zero 20 
 
 - 15 - 
emissions afterward, the present value of total climate damages for 	N̂ >N  years is represented 
by (Supplementary Note 3) 
 
 
hj (E) = ρ
t Dj E,t( )
t=1
N̂
∑ = ρt eα2 jϕ10
−3( E0+t E )
t=1
N
∑ + ρt eα2 jϕ10







The utility function of region  j  for the next 	N  years results from (9), (10), and (14): 5 
 
 
uj (x j , E) =
ρ− ρN+1
1− ρ
x j − ρ
t eα2 jϕ10
−3( E0+t E )
t=1
N
∑ − ρt eα2 jϕ10






The utility level represents the present discounted value of consumption net of medium- and 
long-term costs from climate change. 








j( )1−γ K( )γ , (16) 10 
with  γ = 0.33  representing the elasticity of output with respect to capital. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) 
 
Aj  is calibrated to the average values of output, capital and population in the 
baseline run of RICE-2010 for the period 2006-2055 (Table S3, Fig. S2).  
Letting 
 
κ j = Aj (Lj )







K γ  (17) 15 




 are presented in column 2 of Table S4 in the supplementary notes. 
Finally, average annual capital stock 
 
K j  (in trillions of int-$) and carbon intensity  η j
 (in 
GtC/trillion $) are obtained as the average values in the baseline run of RICE2010 for the period 
2006-2055 (Table S4). 
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Summarizing, each region is characterized by a utility function (15) with region specific 
damages from climate change, a production function (17) with region specific TFP and 
population, an average annual stock of capital, and a carbon intensity parameter. All calibrated 
values are provided in Table S4 in the supplementary notes. 
  5 
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Supplementary Note 1 5 
Proposition 1  
A. Any global unanimity equilibrium satisfies the first-order conditions for Pareto efficiency. 
B. In equilibrium, the share of the global carbon fund that country i receives is proportional to 
its marginal damages 	(hj )'(E) . 
Before proving the proposition, we provide the necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency. 10 
Lemma 1 The necessary first-order conditions for an allocation to be Pareto efficient are: 
 
	
(i)(∀j)(1>η j (hl )'(E))
l
∑
(ii)(∀i , j) (Gi )'(Ki )(Gj )'(K j )
=
1−η j (hl )'(E)
l
∑











  (S1) 
where  
	
E = E j
j
∑  . 



































The program is not convex, because of the last constraint (the 	{Gi }  are concave functions). 
Therefore the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary but not sufficient for the solution of (PE).  



















∑ (hi)'+ γ = 0
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From this last equation we have the conditions: 5 
 
    






)'(E) for all i
l
∑                         (PEa) 































⎟                 (PEb) 
 10 
These are the stated conditions in proposition. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The f.o.c.s for profit-maximization are : 
for all  j  , 	






 .           (S2) 15 
The f.o.c.s for the unanimous agreement on the level of global emissions 	E  are: 




 , (S3) 
from which it follows that 
	
(hl )'(E)= c
p∑  .   Substituting this into equation (S1) gives: 
for all  j ,     	
(Gj )'(K j ) 1−η j (hl∑ )'(E)( ) = rp .   Conditions (i) and (ii) of the Proposition follow 
immediately, proving claim A. 20 
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Supplementary Note 2: Calibration of regional damage cost functions 
Climate damages for region  j  are defined as a function of temperature increase ( d j (ΔT )
) and 




d j (ΔT ) = α1 j e
α2 j ΔT       (S4) 5 
 Damages are measured in annual trillions of international dollars, and temperature change in 
degree Celsius from pre-industrial levels. The parameters 	α1 j  and 	α2 j  are estimated to best fit 
each region’s damages to the data. Estimations for each of the 12 regions exhibit 	R2  and
	adjusted-R
2  above 99% (Table S2). Figure S1 shows the fit of the calibration. 
 10 
 
Supplementary Note 3: Climate damages in year 	t   
Let  E0
c  represent historical cumulative emissions. Consider a stream of average annual emissions 




c + t E  for  t ≤ N , and  Et
cum = E
0
c +NE  for  t ≥ N . Since damage costs as a function 15 
of cumulative emissions are  
D̂j (Et








Dj (E,t) = α1 j e
α2 jϕ10
−3 E0
cum+t E( )  for  t ≤ N , and (S5) 
 
 
Dj (E,t) = α1 j e
α2 jϕ10
−3 E0




hj (E) = ρ
t Dj E,t( )
t=1
N̂
∑ = ρt eα2 jϕ10
−3( E0+t E )
t=1
N
∑ + ρt eα2 jϕ10








Supplementary Note 4: Computing the unanimity equilibrium  
We restrict the price vector 	(p,c ,r)  to the unit simplex 	Δ
2 . Thus, we write 	r =1− p− c . Then the 25 
first-order conditions for profit maximization of the firms can be written: 
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 K j = (G j )
−1 1− p − c






Now consider the three equations: 
 K j
j
∑ = K j
j
∑   (S9) 
 (hj )'(E )
p
cj
∑ = 1   (S10) 
 E = η jG j (K j )
j
∑   (S11) 5 
Equation (S9) says the capital market clears; equation (S10) follows from the fact that 	E  is the 
unanimous choice by citizenries of the global emissions level; and equation (S11) says that the 
emissions market clears. Walras’s Law assures us that the goods market clears. Using equation 
(S8) we eliminate the variables 	{K j }  from equations (S9)-(S11), which now become three 
simultaneous equations in 	(p,c ,E) .  Solving these equations gives the equilibrium.  10 
The Mathematica© program solves equations (S8)—(S11) for 	(p,c) , 	E  and 	K  as follows. 












  (S12) 
















∑ = K j
j=1
12
∑   (S13) 15 
















∑ = E   (S14) 
4. Finally, from the FOC of the unanimity equilibrium 
 
	
p α1 jα̂2 jθ0 j






















+ α1 jα̂2 jθ0 j




c ρ − ρN( )
1− ρ
  (S15) 
 





103 , 	θ0 j:=e
E0α̂2 j , and 	θ1 j(E):=ρe
α̂2 jE .  
 
From equations (S13)—(S15) the program finds the price of output and emissions permits, and 
the total level of emissions: 	(p
* ,c* ,E * ) . Then it computes 
 5 
− 	K j
* : the stock of capital for each region, using (S12); 
− the price of capital: 	r
* =1− p* − c* ; 
− total revenue: 	c* ×E * ;  






(hj )'(E * ) ; 
− emissions of region 	j : 	E j(p,c)=η jκ j K j
*( )γ ;  10 
− the income of region 	j : 	p
* κ j K j
*( )γ + r K j −K j*( )− c* E j(p* ,c* )+aj c*E * ; and 
− the net contribution of region 	j  as 	c




Supplementary Note 5: Robustness check  
The magnitude of climate damages in DICE and RICE models are most likely underestimated. 
For a robustness check we repeat the analysis for a range of much larger damages. In particular, 






, and 10 × α
1j
 in (S4)). We find that the allocation of net recipients shows similar 20 
patterns. If anything, differences between net recipient and net contributors exacerbate with the 
increase in damages. Results are found in Fig. S3. 
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Fig. S1. Estimated annual damage functions (blue solid line) and actual point data from 
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REGIONS	 US	 EU	 Japan	 Russia	 Eurasia	 China	 India	 MiddEast	 Africa	 LatAme	 OHI	 OthAsia	
eTFP	 15.9928	 12.2985	 12.8935	 8.1464	 5.7806	 5.8292	 3.6537	 7.5341	 3.5003	 7.0330	 13.1651	 3.8831	
Avg.	TFP	 15.9011	 12.2715	 12.9671	 8.1820	 5.7673	 5.8109	 3.5881	 7.4153	 3.3848	 6.9627	 13.1237	 3.7896	
Fig. S2. Average 2006-2055 total factor productivity in RICE2010 (TFP), and estimated total 
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Fig. S3. Net contributions and recipients as increases in temperature entail larger damages. 
The bars shown correspond to the net contribution of each region for damages that are 
 ×2, × 5, and × 10  those in RICE2010 baseline run data. A negative value means that the region 
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US	 EU	 Japan	 Russia	 Eurasia	 China	 India	 MiddEast	 Africa	 LatAme	 OHI	 OthAsia	
2005	 0.73070	 0.00935	 0.01173	 0.00334	 0.00104	 0.00086	 0.00663	 0.00994	 0.00554	 0.00746	 0.00529	 0.00278	 0.00571	
2015	 0.94387	 0.02021	 0.04350	 0.00694	 0.00230	 0.00198	 0.05589	 0.02590	 0.01397	 0.02321	 0.01262	 0.01269	 0.01340	
2025	 1.20613	 0.04275	 0.08144	 0.01310	 0.00461	 0.00443	 0.11603	 0.05726	 0.02905	 0.05599	 0.02786	 0.02381	 0.03226	
2035	 1.49926	 0.08173	 0.14601	 0.02251	 0.00835	 0.00886	 0.21457	 0.11373	 0.05521	 0.12313	 0.05556	 0.04273	 0.07008	
2045	 1.80860	 0.14257	 0.24230	 0.03468	 0.01394	 0.01609	 0.36262	 0.20658	 0.09644	 0.24630	 0.10035	 0.07029	 0.13798	
2055	 2.12340	 0.22888	 0.37414	 0.05178	 0.02174	 0.02681	 0.56957	 0.34241	 0.15431	 0.43964	 0.16554	 0.10706	 0.24547	
2065	 2.43529	 0.34364	 0.54447	 0.07454	 0.03195	 0.04173	 0.85110	 0.52974	 0.23210	 0.71822	 0.25557	 0.15344	 0.40420	
2075	 2.73901	 0.49175	 0.75753	 0.10223	 0.04455	 0.06139	 1.21812	 0.78225	 0.33548	 1.11831	 0.37518	 0.21066	 0.63192	
2085	 3.03226	 0.67684	 1.01552	 0.13472	 0.05954	 0.08622	 1.67934	 1.11025	 0.46909	 1.67328	 0.52815	 0.27922	 0.94567	
2095	 3.31449	 0.90387	 1.33649	 0.17220	 0.07684	 0.11661	 2.29977	 1.52496	 0.64049	 2.44189	 0.71828	 0.36502	 1.37078	
2105	 3.58611	 1.17354	 1.73935	 0.21926	 0.09920	 0.15535	 3.11989	 2.03508	 0.83575	 3.37014	 0.95002	 0.47306	 1.91334	
2115	 3.84052	 1.48180	 2.24197	 0.27819	 0.12807	 0.20397	 4.20694	 2.64044	 1.04171	 4.39468	 1.22266	 0.60890	 2.57415	
2125	 4.08099	 1.82910	 2.82489	 0.34466	 0.16105	 0.26050	 5.54053	 3.34469	 1.27361	 5.57047	 1.53693	 0.76794	 3.38989	
2135	 4.30983	 2.24344	 3.51536	 0.42419	 0.20161	 0.32873	 7.13854	 4.16637	 1.52997	 6.95919	 1.89814	 0.95238	 4.34411	
2145	 4.52899	 2.69988	 4.29612	 0.51156	 0.24680	 0.40564	 9.03139	 5.09463	 1.81019	 8.52319	 2.30084	 1.16177	 5.48729	
2155	 4.73957	 3.20350	 5.17183	 0.60746	 0.29706	 0.49174	 11.24380	 6.13336	 2.11460	 10.26080	 2.74639	 1.39769	 6.84170	
2165	 4.94229	 3.75892	 6.14886	 0.71250	 0.35278	 0.58736	 13.79650	 7.28525	 2.44322	 12.17060	 3.23556	 1.66184	 8.42941	
2175	 5.13764	 4.37029	 7.23282	 0.82715	 0.41424	 0.69272	 16.70780	 8.55200	 2.79579	 14.24810	 3.76866	 1.95579	 10.27340	
2185	 5.32595	 5.04153	 8.42873	 0.95179	 0.48172	 0.80796	 19.99370	 9.93456	 3.17187	 16.48650	 4.34563	 2.28099	 12.39750	
2195	 5.50748	 5.77645	 9.74115	 1.08672	 0.55541	 0.93309	 23.66830	 11.43330	 3.57083	 18.87690	 4.96610	 2.63881	 14.82580	
2205	 5.68233	 6.57305	 11.18160	 1.23266	 0.63481	 1.07006	 27.79340	 13.12190	 4.01303	 21.53380	 5.65569	 3.03141	 17.67680	
2215	 5.85083	 7.43195	 12.76010	 1.39022	 0.71966	 1.22012	 32.42670	 15.05060	 4.51102	 24.53710	 6.43059	 3.46086	 21.05990	
Table S1. This table reproduces climate change damages (in trillions of international-$) and 
temperature change (in ºC with respect to 1850) in Nordhaus’ RICE-2010 model. (Source: 
RICE-2010 Excel spreadsheet version 4.012510-baselina run.) 5 
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Table S2. Estimation of regional damage functions parameters. 
  
 
















US	 15.993	 28.1160	 63.5154	 377.904	
EU	 12.299	 29.3408	 66.1483	 574.429	
Japan	 12.894	 6.0218	 13.5586	 110.259	
Russia	 8.146	 3.4653	 7.7646	 122.517	
Eurasia	 5.781	 3.3683	 7.5898	 193.942	
China	 5.829	 24.9943	 55.6930	 1428.870	
India	 3.654	 13.4476	 30.3280	 1490.660	
MiddEast	 7.534	 7.7420	 17.3715	 305.861	
Africa	 3.500	 14.1933	 32.0531	 1671.710	
LatAme	 7.033	 16.2705	 36.9398	 705.643	
OHI	 13.165	 7.6236	 17.0958	 135.729	
OthAsia	 3.883	 13.3611	 30.3416	 1353.650	
Table S3. Estimated TFP, and average annual output, capital and population values from RICE-
2010 baseline run (2006-2055). 
  
 

















α1 j 	  
α2 j 	
US	 8.0926	 63.5154	 0.0789	 0.0672	 0.8080	
EU	 8.3429	 66.1483	 0.0578	 0.0867	 0.8564	
Japan	 2.7546	 13.5586	 0.0539	 0.0134	 0.7970	
Russia	 1.8737	 7.7646	 0.1441	 0.0052	 0.8470	
Eurasia	 1.8338	 7.5898	 0.1304	 0.0075	 0.8750	
China	 7.4834	 55.6930	 0.1369	 0.1019	 0.9876	
India	 4.8316	 30.3280	 0.0822	 0.1003	 0.8595	
MiddEast	 3.2878	 17.3715	 0.1234	 0.0580	 0.7484	
Africa	 5.0156	 32.0531	 0.0726	 0.1717	 0.8525	
LatAme	 5.5100	 36.9398	 0.0591	 0.0528	 0.8247	
OHI	 3.2531	 17.0958	 0.0999	 0.0235	 0.8559	
OthAsia	 4.7999	 30.3416	 0.0719	 0.0501	 1.0333	
Table S4. Calibrated values based on the baseline run of RICE2010 
  
 
 - 32 - 
 




per capita (2015) 
 thousand $ 
Per capita 
thousand $  
Average 
trillion $ billion(109) $ 
US 48.97	 58.16 21.98 123.113 
EU 31.04	 40.14 23.06 10.066 
Japan 35.05	 42.82 4.72 12.322 
Russia 16.27	 21.87 2.68 44.715 
Eurasia 8.46	 13.49 2.62 32.333 
China 8.59	 13.69 19.56 90.989 
India 3.66	 7.15 10.66 -85.143 
Midd.East 14.20	 19.85 6.07 15.609 
Africa 3.51	 6.81 11.39 -234.817 
LatAme 11.51	 18.12 12.78 6.224 
OHI 35.15	 43.89 5.96 36.051 
Oth.Asia 3.83	 7.80 10.55 -51.462 
Table S5. Annual Income (GDP) and annual net payment from emission permits. 
Income is measured as gross firm revenues plus net income from capital minus the net 
payment for emission permits: 
 
	
Incomej = pκ j K j(p,c)( )γ⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+ r K j −K j(p,c)( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦− c E j(p,c)−aj cE⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   
 
Population is the average population in 2016-2055. 
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